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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has often been
criticized. Judges and scholars have contended that existing Establishment
Clause tests give courts too little guidance and too much discretion.1 Some
judges and advocates have been calling on the Court to replace those existing
tests with a test that compares challenged practices to long-standing historically
accepted ones.2
But that would be a very bad idea. Such a historical-practice test would be
much more difficult to apply than the Court’s current jurisprudence. Switching
to a historical-practice test would only engender greater confusion among lower
courts than there is now.
Proponents of a historical-practice test want to expand to all Establishment
Clause cases the history-based analysis of the Supreme Court’s two cases
concerning opening prayers before legislative bodies 3 —Marsh v. Chambers4
and Town of Greece v. Galloway.5 The Supreme Court concluded in Marsh that
legislative prayer is constitutional because, in 1789, Congress authorized public
funding of legislative chaplains just three days before approving the language of
the First Amendment. 6 The Court reasoned, therefore, that the First
Amendment’s framers could not have thought that its Establishment Clause
prohibits legislative prayer.7 The Court also emphasized that the practice of
legislative prayer has continued in Congress from 1789 through the present,
without interruption.8
Attempting to apply this kind of analysis to other types of Establishment
Clause controversies would raise some problematic questions, however. First,
whose actions should be relevant? Only actions of the federal government
should matter, not actions by state or local governments.9 That’s because the
Establishment Clause did not govern the states when the Bill of Rights was
passed; it was the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 that
rendered the Establishment Clause applicable to the states, and the Supreme
Court did not recognize this until the 1940s.10 So eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury actions by state or local governments cannot properly be treated as
evidence of how the Establishment Clause was originally understood. Indeed,

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014).
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787–88, 790.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 788, 790.
See infra Section III.A.1.
See infra text accompanying notes 105–07.
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in 1789 and long after, state and local governments engaged in conduct that
egregiously violated the Establishment Clause—for example, by maintaining
established churches and religious tests for office.11
Second, what time frame should be relevant? The further past the 1789
enactment of the First Amendment one looks, the less likely it is that federalgovernment action can be treated as consistent with the First Amendment’s
intent.12 For the composition of Congress changes every two years, and the
understanding of an enactment’s intent grows dimmer over time.13 Indeed, in
1798, less than a decade after approving the language of the First Amendment,
Congress passed the Sedition Act14—a law that has long been condemned as
plainly unconstitutional because it made criticizing federal officials or the
United States a crime.15 Therefore, only federal-government actions that took
place in 1789 or shortly thereafter should be considered as potential indicators
of how the Establishment Clause was originally understood.
This limited universe of federal actions may be sufficient in the legislativeprayer area, given Congress’s authorization of legislative chaplains just three
days before its approval of the language of the First Amendment, together with
the unbroken continuance of legislative prayer in Congress since then.16 But in
most Establishment Clause contexts, there are no federal-government actions
during the relevant historical period that courts can consider for guidance.17 For
example, Establishment Clause cases often concern the role of religion in the
public schools, but free public education was virtually nonexistent in the late
eighteenth century.18 Religious displays on public property are another common
source of Establishment Clause controversy, but the first federal monument is
believed to have been erected in 1808. 19 One other regularly litigated
Establishment Clause issue is the extent to which the Clause prohibits religious
exemptions from employment-discrimination or public-accommodations laws,
but in the late eighteenth century there were no federal laws barring
discrimination by employers or businesses.20 Establishment Clause cases also
often relate to whether government can provide public funding to religious
schools or religious social-service providers, but in the late eighteenth century

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra text accompanying notes 109–17.
See infra Section III.A.2.
See infra text accompanying notes 124–29.
Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
See infra text accompanying notes 130–32.
See infra text accompanying note 154.
See infra Section III.B.1.
See infra text accompanying notes 158–66.
See infra text accompanying notes 167–74.
See infra text accompanying notes 175–76.
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the federal government was not funding general education or social-service
programs.21
Indeed, opinions and briefs that advocate an Establishment Clause analysis
focusing on long-standing historical practices identify only three arguably
relevant actions that were taken by the federal government close in time to
Congress’s approval of the First Amendment: (1) the creation of the
congressional chaplaincies; (2) Congress’s passage in 1789 of a resolution
asking the president to issue Thanksgiving proclamations; and (3) Congress’s
authorization in 1791 of chaplains in the military. 22 Even assuming that
legislative prayer, Thanksgiving proclamations, and military chaplains are
consistent with the Establishment Clause’s intent (the First Amendment’s
leading architects, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, thought that they
weren’t), they provide little guidance for how to resolve the kinds of
Establishment Clause cases that commonly confront the courts today. 23 For
legislative prayer is a ceremonial act that is principally directed at legislators
themselves, not the public.24 The Thanksgiving proclamations given by early
presidents were nonsectarian, ecumenical, isolated written statements that were
not presented in coercive environments.25 And military chaplains are viewed as
necessary to enable members of the military to practice their religions, for
soldiers often are in places where they otherwise would not have access to
clergy. 26 None of these practices is helpful to determining how the
Establishment Clause should be applied in the coercive setting of public schools,
to permanent and prominent sectarian displays, to requests on religious grounds
for exemptions from anti-discrimination laws, or to the provision of substantial
sums of public funds to private religious institutions.
And even if there were more relevant historical practices against which
current practices could be measured, how exactly are courts to compare modern
practices with historical ones? Justice Kennedy, in a partially concurring and
partially dissenting opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, advocated for a historical-practice test that “must permit not only
legitimate practices two centuries old but also any other practices with no greater
potential for an establishment of religion.”27 How is one to judge whether one

21. See infra text accompanying notes 177–79.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 238–40.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 241–47.
24. See infra text accompanying note 248.
25. See infra text accompanying note 249.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 250–51.
27. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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practice has a “greater potential for an establishment of religion” 28 than
another?29
All that said, we do not contend that there should be no role for history in
Establishment Clause analysis. But what is proper for courts to principally
consider are the historical events that led to the Clause’s creation, not the events
that occurred after the Clause was adopted. 30 And such proper historical
analysis does not require the Supreme Court to reinvent the wheel. For the
Supreme Court already engaged in such analysis in devising its existing
Establishment Clause tests, looking at European and colonial history to
understand what kinds of practices the First Amendment’s framers wanted to
stop, as well as the writings of the leading thinkers behind the Establishment
Clause, Madison and Jefferson.31
Already informed by history, the Supreme Court’s existing Establishment
Clause tests well protect the values underlying the Clause, prohibiting (among
other conduct) public funding of religious activity, governmental favoritism for
any religion over another or for religion over nonreligion, governmental
coercion to take part in religious exercise, and governmental entanglement with
religion.32 Abandoning these clear rules for a vague and amorphous historicalpractice test would harm those values, in addition to confusing judges.33 The
Court should not venture down this ill-advised path.
II. THE SUGGESTIONS THAT CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE BE REPLACED WITH A HISTORICAL-PRACTICE TEST
A. Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and Criticism of It
The polestar of Establishment Clause analysis has long been a three-part test
known as the Lemon test, named after one of the cases that set it forth, Lemon v.
Kurtzman. 34 At the most general level, the test asks whether governmental
action has a primary purpose of advancing religion, has a principal effect of
doing the same, or fosters excessive governmental entanglement with religion.35
More specifically, the Supreme Court has enunciated a number of particular
ways in which an unconstitutional effect of advancing religion may be shown.
For example, the government must not favor or endorse any religion over
28. Id.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 252–53.
30. See infra text accompanying note 254.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 255–84.
32. See id.
33. See infra text accompanying note 285.
34. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35. See id. at 612–13; see also, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–
60 (2005); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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another or religion over nonreligion.36 It must not coerce anyone to participate
in religion or its exercise.37 It must not provide funding for religious instruction
or activity.38 It must not delegate governmental power to religious institutions.39
Despite these detailed rules, the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has often been criticized as vague and difficult to apply.40 For a replacement
test, critics of the existing jurisprudence have looked to a history-oriented
analysis that has thus far been applied by a majority of the Court as a principal
test only in the Court’s two cases concerning prayer at the opening of sessions
of legislative bodies, Marsh v. Chambers41 and Town of Greece v. Galloway.42
B. The Supreme Court’s Limited Use of Historical-Practice Analysis
In Marsh, the Supreme Court considered the Nebraska state legislature’s
practice of employing a publicly funded chaplain to open its sessions with
prayer.43 The Eighth Circuit had applied the Lemon test to hold the practice
unconstitutional. 44 But the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “[t]he
opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with
prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”45
The Court emphasized that the First Congress passed a statute providing
public funding for congressional chaplains on September 22, 1789, and that just
three days later Congress approved the final language of the Bill of Rights.46 In
the Court’s view, therefore, “the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion
Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation
of that Amendment.”47 “It can hardly be thought,” explained the Court,
that in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint
and to pay a [C]haplain for each House and also voted to approve the
36. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 875–76; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
308, 316 (2000); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592–
94 (1989), dicta on different issue disapproved by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565,
579–80 (2014).
37. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 310–12; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
587 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 219, 228 (1997); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
621 (1988).
39. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982).
40. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–400
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
41. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790–92 (1983).
42. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575–79 (2014).
43. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784.
44. Id. at 786.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 788.
47. Id.
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draft of the First Amendment for submission to the States, they
intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid what
they had just declared acceptable.48
“In this context,” the Court added, “historical evidence sheds light not only on
what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how
they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First
Congress—their actions reveal their intent.” 49 The Court also stressed that
Congress’s “practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without
interruption ever since” the First Congress.50
Yet the Court was careful to limit the reach of its historical analysis to the
unusual circumstances before it. “Standing alone,” cautioned the Court,
“historical patterns cannot justify contemporaneous violations of constitutional
guarantees.”51 “[B]ut,” declared the Court, “there is far more here than simply
historical patterns.”52 The close temporal proximity of Congress’s approval of
publicly funded legislative chaplains and its approval of the language of the
Establishment Clause, together with the fact that legislative prayer has continued
in Congress without interruption since 1789, combined for a “unique history.”53
The Court accordingly upheld the practice of legislative prayer “[i]n light of
th[is] unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years.”54
Notwithstanding the care the Marsh Court took to cabin the circumstances in
which its historical analysis could apply, some Supreme Court Justices have
attempted to broaden the use of historical-practice analysis to other
Establishment Clause contexts. Just one year after Marsh, in Lynch v. Donnelly,
the Court upheld by a 5–4 vote a city holiday display that contained a crèche,
along with numerous secular symbols.55 The Court’s opinion documented at
length what it characterized as “an unbroken history of official acknowledgment
by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from
at least 1789.”56 The Court, however, ultimately used the traditional Lemon test
to rule that the holiday display was constitutional. 57 And Justice O’Connor,
despite technically joining the majority’s opinion and providing the fifth vote
for it, wrote a separate concurrence in which she argued that the principal

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 791.
Id. at 792.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671, 687 (1984).
Id. at 674–78.
See id. at 679–85.
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Establishment Clause test should be whether a practice has a purpose or effect
of endorsing religion.58
In its 1989 decision in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, a majority of the Court accepted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test,
upholding one holiday display and striking down another.59 Justice Kennedy,
however, wrote a partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion, joined by
three other Justices, that advocated a much broader use of historical-practice
analysis than what Marsh had permitted.60 He argued that “whatever standard
the Court applies to Establishment Clause claims, it must at least suggest results
consistent with our precedents and the historical practices that, by tradition, have
informed our First Amendment jurisprudence.” 61 Justice Kennedy proposed
that “the relevance of history” should not be “confined to the inquiry into
whether the challenged practice itself is a part of our accepted traditions dating
back to the Founding.”62 Rather, in his view, “the meaning of the Clause is to
be determined by reference to historical practices and understandings.” 63
Specifically, “[w]hatever test we choose to apply must permit not only legitimate
practices two centuries old but also any other practices with no greater potential
for an establishment of religion.”64
An analysis focusing on historical practices again failed to gain approval of a
Court majority in the 2005 decision Van Orden v. Perry.65 There, by a 5–4 vote,
the Court upheld the display of a Ten Commandments monument on state capitol
grounds that also featured numerous secular displays.66 A four-Justice plurality
spent much of its opinion cataloguing past “official acknowledgment by all three
branches of government of religion’s role in American life” and “of the role
played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage.”67 The plurality did
not attempt to enunciate any particular historical-practice test—or, for that
matter, any test—that it felt should govern religious-display or other
Establishment Clause cases, however. 68 Moreover, Justice Breyer, the fifth
Justice in the majority, refused to join the plurality’s analysis and instead wrote

58. See id. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
59. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989),
dicta on different issue disapproved by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 579–80 (2014).
60. Id. at 669–74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 669.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 670.
64. Id.
65. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
66. Id. at 681 & n.1, 691–92 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 686–89 (plurality opinion).
68. See id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
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a separate concurrence that focused on whether the monument was divisive and
its content, setting, and purpose.69
Subsequently, in the 2014 legislative-prayer case Town of Greece v.
Galloway, a Supreme Court majority—as in Marsh—applied a historicalpractice analysis.70 The Court held that it was permissible for legislative prayers
to contain expressly sectarian references, emphasizing that sectarian legislative
prayers date back to the First Congress and have continued ever since.71 In so
ruling, the Court relied heavily on Marsh, stating that “[t]he case teaches . . . that
the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices
and understandings.’”72
But as in Marsh, the Court was careful to limit the reach of such historical
analysis. The Court cautioned that “Marsh must not be understood as permitting
a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical
foundation.”73 Rather, “Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary
to define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows
that the specific practice is permitted.”74 In other words, “[a]ny test the Court
adopts must acknowledge a practice that [1] was accepted by the Framers and
[2] has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change.”75
Greece did not point to any practices outside the legislative-prayer context
that meet these two requirements, however. Indeed, far from holding that
challenged practices must be measured against historical practices in all
Establishment Clause contexts, Greece applied long-standing standard
Establishment Clause rules in the legislative-prayer context. In addition to
conducting a historical analysis, the opinion relied on the principles that
government must not become excessively “involve[d] . . . in religious matters,”76
must “maintain[] a policy of nondiscrimination” instead of favoring one faith

69. See id. at 698–705 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
70. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577–79 (2014).
71. Id. at 578–79.
72. Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 577.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 581 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 188–89 (2012)).
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over another,77 must not “coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise,’”78 and must not “proselytize . . . constituents.”79
Most recently, in American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, some
Supreme Court Justices again pushed for an expanded use of the historicalpractice analysis, but the Court’s majority opinion followed a quite different
path.80 American Legion upheld the display of a cross as a war memorial on
public property.81 In a plurality opinion, four Justices argued that the Lemon test
should no longer be applied in cases involving “longstanding” “use[s], for
ceremonial, celebratory, or commemorative purposes of words or symbols with
religious associations.” 82 The plurality contended that these kinds of cases
should be decided by “focus[ing] on the particular issue at hand and look[ing]
to history for guidance.” 83 Principally relying on the history of legislative
prayer, and mentioning several other types of late-eighteenth-century
governmental actions as well, the plurality then concluded that “categories of
monuments, symbols, and practices with a longstanding history” are
“constitutional” if they reflect “respect and tolerance for differing views, an
honest endeavor to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and a recognition
of the important role that religion plays in the lives of many Americans.”84
The sections of the American Legion opinion that garnered a majority did not
compare the cross display at issue to historical practices that date back to the
Founding Era, however. 85 The majority opinion made only limited use of
history, mainly considering the particular history of the cross itself and what it
was understood to mean when it was erected. 86 In upholding the cross, the
majority emphasized that (1) the cross communicated a secular message of
honoring local soldiers who perished during World War I;87 (2) all the individual
soldiers honored by the cross apparently happened to be Christians;88 (3) the
cross’s designers did not have “discriminatory intent” toward religious

77. Id. at 585; accord McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005).
78. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 586 (plurality opinion) (quoting County of Allegheny v.
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part)); accord Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
79. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587 (plurality opinion) (citing Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S.
700, 720–21 (2010) (plurality opinion); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308
(2000)).
80. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
81. Id. at 2090.
82. Id. at 2081–82 (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 2087 (plurality opinion).
84. Id. at 2088–89 (plurality opinion).
85. See id. at 2074–75, 2082–2087, 2089–91 (majority opinion).
86. See id. at 2074–78, 2089–90 (majority opinion).
87. See id. at 2089 (majority opinion).
88. See id. at 2077, 2090 (majority opinion).
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minorities;89 (4) many nonreligious monuments were erected near the cross;90
and (5) removing the cross would send a divisive message of “hostility to
religion.”91 In other words, though it did not say that it was applying the Lemon
test, the majority analyzed whether the cross had a purpose or effect of
advancing religion—Lemon’s principal criteria.92
C. Recent Arguments for Expansion of Historical-Practice Analysis
Even though Greece strictly cabined how far historical analysis should extend
in Establishment Clause cases and applied traditional Establishment Clause
tests, and even though the American Legion majority did not apply a historicalpractice test, some judges and advocates have argued—incorrectly—that Greece
and American Legion replaced existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence with
a historical-practice test, or at least that the Supreme Court should do so. For
example, in New Doe Child #1 v. United States, a case that challenged the use
of the phrase “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency, two of a three-judge panel’s
members joined an opinion that took the position that Greece issued an
“unqualified directive that the Establishment Clause ‘must’ be interpreted
according to historical practices and understandings” and that “this historical
approach is not limited to a particular factual context.”93 But as of this writing,
in the five years since Greece was decided, New Doe Child has been the only
appellate opinion known to the authors in which a majority of a panel took this
position and relied principally on a historical-practice analysis to decide an
Establishment Clause case outside the legislative-prayer area.
Other judges have floated similar arguments in concurring or dissenting
opinions. For instance, in a concurrence in Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola
(another case concerning a cross on public property), an Eleventh Circuit judge
argued that “Greece states an unequivocal, exceptionless rule . . . : ‘[T]he
Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and
understandings.’”94 In a dissenting opinion in Felix v. City of Bloomfield, a
Tenth Circuit judge called on the Circuit to “reexamine [its] Establishment
Clause cases” and “return[] to a more historically-congruent understanding of
the Establishment Clause.”95 And in a concurrence in Smith v. Jefferson County
89. See id. at 2074 (majority opinion).
90. See id. at 2077, 2089 (majority opinion).
91. See id. at 2087 (majority opinion).
92. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
93. New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Town
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)).
94. Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 903 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2018) (Newsom, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576), vacated and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2772 (2019).
95. Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214, 1220–21 (10th Cir.) (Kelly, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 357 (2017).
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Board of School Commissioners, a Sixth Circuit judge expressed the view that
“Greece is apparently a major doctrinal shift regarding the Establishment
Clause, declaring a two-pronged test for Establishment Clause cases, a test based
upon the historical approach . . . and adding the [anti-]coercion principle.”96
Though contentions that the federal courts should expand the historicalpractice analysis of Marsh and Greece beyond the legislative-prayer context
have gained little traction with judges, certain advocates have continued to press
the Supreme Court and the circuit courts to do so. For example, one amicus
brief filed in American Legion in support of the cross display argued that the
Court should replace the Lemon test with the test that Justice Kennedy proposed
in his Allegheny opinion: a practice is constitutional if it “is a part of our accepted
traditions dating back to the Founding” or has “no greater potential for an
establishment of religion.”97 Another amicus brief filed in American Legion
similarly advocated jettisoning Lemon in favor of a test that asks whether a
challenged “activity ‘fits within the tradition long followed’ throughout the
Nation.”98 In Kondrat’yev, an amicus brief argued for adoption of an “analysis”
that “look[s] to American history as a whole to determine whether the practice
at issue is part of our heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom.”99 And
a supplemental brief in Kondrat’yev contended that, under American Legion, the
Kondrat’yev cross display should be compared to monuments erected long
ago.100
III. QUESTIONS ABOUT AND FLAWS OF A HISTORICAL-PRACTICE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST
Instead of making the law clearer, abandoning existing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in favor of a historical-practice test such as the one Justice
Kennedy proposed in Allegheny would provide courts much less guidance than
they have now. That is principally because there are very few historical practices
to which current practices can properly be compared. 101 To find historical
practices that might legitimately be viewed as reflecting the intent of the First
96. Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 602 (6th Cir. 2015)
(Batchelder, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
97. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Am. Ctr. for Law & Justice in Support of Petitioners at 11–
13, American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 17-1717), 2018
WL 3159307 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
98. Corrected Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of
Petitioners at 10, American Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717), 2018 WL 3159307 (quoting
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577).
99. Brief of the Int’l Mun. Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 14,
Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 903 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-13025), vacated and
remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2772 (2019).
100. Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 12–13, Kondrat’yev, 903 F.3d 1169 (No. 17-13025).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 105–253.
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Amendment’s framers, one must look only at federal practices, not state or local
actions, because the First Amendment originally applied only to the federal
government.102 Moreover, one must consider only federal actions that occurred
in 1789 or shortly thereafter, for less than a decade later, Congress had come to
pass legislation that plainly violated the First Amendment.103 The few federal
actions relating to religion that satisfy these criteria shed little light on how to
resolve most kinds of Establishment Clause controversies that confront courts
today.104
A. What Kinds of Historical Practices Legitimately Shed Light on the Intent of
the Establishment Clause’s Framers?
Before proceeding with any attempt to apply historical-practice analysis
similar to that of Marsh and Greece to ascertain the intent of the Establishment
Clause’s framers, one must first determine what kinds of historical practices can
legitimately be considered as evidence of that intent. There are two principal
questions: Whose actions are relevant? And what time frame is relevant?
1. Whose Actions Are Relevant?
Which governmental bodies’ actions can properly be viewed as potentially
evincing the intent of the First Amendment’s framers? Only actions of the
federal government—and not state or local actions—can legitimately provide
guidance. That is because the First Amendment did not apply to the states when
the Bill of Rights was enacted. 105 It was the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in 1868, that rendered the First Amendment applicable to the
states. 106 And the Supreme Court did not recognize that the Establishment
Clause governed the actions of the states until the 1940s.107
Therefore, pre-1868—and arguably pre-1940s—actions by state and local
governments cannot legitimately be considered as evidence of what the
Establishment Clause was intended to allow. Indeed, in 1789 and long
thereafter, many state and local governments engaged in conduct that
egregiously violated the Establishment Clause.108
At the time Congress approved the Bill of Rights, for example, six states
maintained established churches: Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland,

102. See infra text accompanying notes 105–19.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 120–53.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 238–53.
105. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985).
106. Id.
107. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5, 14–15 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 109–17.
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Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina.109 Connecticut did not
disestablish until 1818, New Hampshire until 1819, and Massachusetts—the last
state to maintain an established church—until 1833.110
Moreover, most of the states had religious tests for holding office during the
late eighteenth century.111 Some of these restrictions limited office-holding to
Protestants; some others limited it to Christians.112 Many of these restrictions
remained in place well into the nineteenth century or even beyond: for instance,
Pennsylvania’s stayed in place until 1874, New Hampshire’s until 1877, and
Maryland’s restriction—which at its end limited office-holding to believers in
God—remained on the books until the Supreme Court struck it down in Torcaso
v. Watkins in 1961.113
In addition, many states’ constitutions had other provisions that denied nonChristians full civil rights or otherwise favored Christians during the late
eighteenth century. For instance, according to Douglas Laycock, at least five
states “denied full civil rights to Catholics.”114 Pennsylvania reaffirmed in 1790
its Bill of Rights of 1776, leaving in a provision stating that no man “who
acknowledges the being of a God” could be deprived of civil rights. 115
Pennsylvania law also made it a crime to “willfully, premeditatedly, and
despitefully blaspheme, or speak lightly or profanely of Almighty God, Christ
Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Scriptures of Truth.” 116 And, until 1968,
New Hampshire’s Bill of Rights provided that “[e]very denomination of
Christians, demeaning themselves quietly and as good subjects of the state, shall
be equally under the protection of the law.”117

109. See Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U.
L. REV. 1113, 1132–33, 1132 nn.97 & 98 (1988); see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1385, 1457–1536 (2004); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2121–29 (2003).
110. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255 n.20 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (citing SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY (1902)); see also MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS 28–32 (1984);
McConnell, supra note 109, at 2126; Steven K. Green, The Separation of Church and State in the
United States, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIAS (2014), http://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/
10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-29?print=pdf.
111. See Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 916 (1986).
112. See J. Jackson Barlow, Officeholding: Religious-Based Limitations in Eighteenth-Century
State Constitutions, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 346–48 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 2000).
113. See id.; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
114. See Laycock, supra note 111, at 916.
115. See Barlow, supra note 112, at 347 (internal citation omitted).
116. See Cobb, supra note 110, at 516 (internal citation omitted).
117. See id. (emphasis added).
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As the Establishment Clause did not apply to the states when it was enacted,
and as many states engaged in conduct that egregiously violated the Clause when
it was approved and long after, even Justices who have appeared favorably
disposed to a historical-practice test have agreed that only actions of the federal
government should be relevant. In his Allegheny opinion, where he proposed
his historical-practice test, Justice Kennedy also wrote (joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and White):
[T]he relevant historical practices are those conducted by
governmental units which were subject to the constraints of the
Establishment Clause. Acts . . . perpetrated in the 18th and 19th
centuries by States and municipalities are of course irrelevant to this
inquiry, but the practices of past Congresses and Presidents are highly
informative.118
Similarly, in a concurring opinion in Greece, Justice Alito (joined by Justice
Scalia) wrote that “what is important” in historical-practice analysis of
legislative prayer “is . . . what happened before congressional sessions during
the period leading up to the adoption of the First Amendment.”119
2. What Time Frame is Relevant?
The second principal question about how to properly apply Marsh/Greecestyle historical analysis is what time frame should be relevant? Recall that
Congress agreed on the final language of the Bill of Rights on September 25,
1789.120 How far past that date can federal-government actions colorably be
considered presumptively consistent with the intent of the First Amendment’s
framers?
Before answering that question, we note that its very premise is shaky. The
assumption that actions of the First Congress are necessarily consistent with
constitutional intent is quite questionable (though we accept this assumption
arguendo for purposes of this article). The First Amendment was not even
ratified until December 1791,121 after the First Congress had concluded,122 so
the Amendment technically was never even in force when the First Congress
served. More importantly, as Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent in Marsh,
Legislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment,
the pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of business,
do not always pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of

118. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 n.7 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
119. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 600 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
120. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
121. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1985).
122. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
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legislation they enact, and this must be assumed to be as true of the
members of the First Congress as any other.123
To assume that members of the First Congress always acted consistently with
constitutional intent is to put them on a pedestal that ignores that they were
human politicians with the same flaws and weaknesses that have always affected
people in power.
Keeping that starting point in mind, it must be the case that the further past
the approval of the First Amendment one looks, the less likely it becomes that
federal-government action would be consistent with the original understanding
of the First Amendment. Memories fade as time passes, and the understanding
of a constitutional provision’s intent thus grows dimmer with the passage of
time. As time ticks on, the importance of complying with a constitutional clause
one may have voted for may also lessen. Thus, even those who served in the
First Congress might have become more prone to vote for unconstitutional
legislation when they served in later Congresses.
And there was substantial turnover from Congress to Congress in the 1790s,
much more so than today.124 The First Congress—the one that approved the Bill
of Rights—met from March 1789 to March 1791.125 Of a total of 103 members
who served in the Second Congress, which met from March 1791 to March
1793, 126 42 had not served in the First Congress. 127 By the Fifth Congress,
which met from March 1797 to March 1799, 128 only 23 out of a total 162
members had served in the First. 129 Because Congress had fewer and fewer
members, as the 1790s passed, who had served when the Bill of Rights was
approved, congressional action became progressively less likely during that

123. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 814–15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
124. See WILLIAM T. EGAR, CONG. RES. SERV., R41545, CONGRESSIONAL CAREERS:
SERVICE TENURE AND PATTERNS OF MEMBER SERVICE, 1789–2019 3–5 (2019).
125. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, supra note 122.
126. See id.
127. See Official Annotated Membership Roster by State with Vacancy and Special Election
Information: First Congress, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
https://historycms2.house.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=40186 (last visited Jan. 29,
2019); Official Annotated Membership Roster by State with Vacancy and Special Election
Information: Second Congress, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
https://historycms2.house.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=40187 (last visited Jan. 29,
2019). These figures include members who were replaced during the congressional term and their
replacements. Thus, while 103 individual members served in the Second Congress, there were
fewer congressmen serving at any given time.
128. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, supra note 122.
129. See Official Annotated Membership Roster by State with Vacancy and Special Election
Information: Fifth Congress, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
https://historycms2.house.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=40191 (last visited Jan. 29,
2019). Again, these figures include all members who served in the Fifth Congress, including those
who were replaced during the congressional term and their replacements.
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decade to reflect an accurate understanding of the intent of constitutional
protections.
So it is not surprising that in 1798, less than a decade after approving the First
Amendment, Congress passed the Sedition Act.130 The statute made it a crime,
punishable by imprisonment, to criticize federal officials or the United States.131
Though it expired in 1801 and therefore never reached the Supreme Court, the
Sedition Act is roundly considered to have been unconstitutional.132
But one need not move forward a decade in time from the enactment of the
Bill of Rights to find examples of congressional actions whose constitutionality
was, at best, highly doubtful. Just seven months after approving the Bill of
Rights, the First Congress itself passed “An Act for the Punishment of certain
Crimes against the United States.”133 This law required that people convicted of
certain theft crimes “be publicly whipped, not exceeding thirty-nine stripes.”134
The law is now considered to have been contrary to the intent of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.135 Not long after,
paying even less regard to the Eighth Amendment—which is now understood as
barring capital punishment for crimes against individuals when the victim’s life
is not taken136—the Second Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty
on any employee of the United States post office convicted of stealing mail with
money or other financial instruments in it.137
What is more, the very first act struck down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional was passed by the First Congress. In Marbury v. Madison, the
Supreme Court held that a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the
Supreme Court power to issue writs of mandamus violated Section 2 of Article
III of the Constitution.138 And another provision of the Judiciary Act required
the Supreme Court and district judges to say the words “So help me God” when
taking their oath of office,139 directly contravening the command of Article VI
of the Constitution that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”140 The

130. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (citing Sedition Act of 1798,
ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596).
131. See id. at 273–74.
132. See id. at 276 & n.16; id. at 296 (Black, J., concurring).
133. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
134. Id. § 16.
135. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977).
136. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437, opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 554
U.S. 945 (2008).
137. See An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post-Roads Within the United States, ch. 7,
§ 16, 1 Stat. 232, 236 (1792).
138. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147, 176 (1803).
139. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76.
140. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 491 (1961).
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Judiciary Act was passed on September 24, 1789,141 just two years after the U.S.
Constitution was submitted to the states for ratification (September 17, 1787)142
and barely a year after the Constitution was ratified by enough states to become
effective (June 21, 1788).143
There are, unfortunately, darker and more recent examples than these of
governmental bodies ignoring—soon after they were approved—constitutional
provisions that governed them. The Fourteenth Amendment was approved by
Congress on June 13, 1866, and it was ratified on July 9, 1868.144 But barely a
month after approving the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed a law
affirming continued racial segregation of District of Columbia public schools,145
conduct that our society has long recognized contravened the Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.146 And by 1870, states had started to enact provisions
requiring segregation.147 By 1878, seven states—Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia,
Missouri, North Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia—had amended their
constitutions to require racially segregated schools, and at least two others had
enacted statutes codifying the same. 148 Likewise, the same year that the
Fifteenth Amendment—which guaranteed African Americans the right to
vote—was enacted,149 states started to pass measures, such as poll taxes, that
were plainly intended to frustrate that Amendment’s promise.150
This troublesome history makes it difficult to define the time frame for
historical practices that might legitimately be looked at as evincing the
Establishment Clause’s intent. We will not attempt to set a specific time frame,
but we can say that the history shows this: Any action beyond the immediate
proximity of Congress’s approval of the First Amendment on September 25,
1789151 must be considered with some doubt. Any action after the conclusion
of the term of the First Congress in March 1791152 should be considered with

141. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
142. NCC Staff, The Day the Constitution Was Ratified, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CENTER (June
21, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-day-the-constitution-was-ratified.
143. Id.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
145. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 217, 14 Stat. 216.
146. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
147. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of
Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 462 (2014).
148. See id. at 486–87, 486 nn.233 & 236, 487 nn.240–41, 244–45 & 247.
149. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
150. See David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 388–89 (2011).
151. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
152. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, supra note 122.
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much greater doubt. And conduct that occurred by 1798—the year of the
enactment of the Sedition Act153—should not be considered a reliable guide.
B. Lack of Sufficient Historical Examples of Governmental Actions that Might
Legitimately Evince the Intent of the Establishment Clause’s Framers
With these limitations on what conduct might legitimately be viewed as
presumptively consistent with the intent of the Establishment Clause—federal
governmental actions taken in 1789 or shortly thereafter—history leaves us with
little to go on. To be sure, we assume that history can be a useful guide in the
legislative-prayer arena itself, given the Supreme Court’s reliance in Marsh on
Congress’s approval of public funding of congressional chaplains three days
before Congress’s approval of the language of the Bill of Rights, and on the
unbroken continuation of legislative prayer in Congress since then.154 But with
respect to most other kinds of Establishment Clause cases, there are no relevant
examples of federal-government conduct during the relevant time frame. 155
Most of the examples of historical conduct that advocates of a historical-practice
test cite either were not taken by the federal government or did not occur during
the proper time frame.156 The few instances of federal governmental actions
concerning religion that did occur during the appropriate time frame are not
helpful to deciding the types of Establishment Clause controversies that
presently predominate in the courts.157
1. Lack of Founding-Era Federal Involvement in Most Areas that Trigger
Church-State Controversies Today
In the late eighteenth century, the federal government simply was not involved
in most of the contexts that trigger Establishment Clause litigation today. Thus,
there are no examples of federal actions that could legitimately provide courts
with guidance under a historical-practice test in most kinds of Establishment
Clause cases.
Take, for example, religion in public schools, a source of frequent
Establishment Clause conflict in the courts today.158 The federal government
did not maintain public schools during the time period that can be legitimately
considered under a historical-practice test. As Justice O’Connor has pointed out,
“free public education was virtually nonexistent in the late 18th century.”159 The
153. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (citing Sedition Act of 1798,
ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596).
154. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 158–90.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 191–237.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 238–51.
158. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
159. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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schools that did exist in the colonies and in the decades after the American
Revolution were largely private and sectarian. 160 And to the extent that
governmental bodies did provide for schooling, those bodies were state or
local.161 The public-school system that we know today did not begin to take root
until the 1820s and 1830s.162 The first public high school in the United States is
generally said to have opened in Boston in 1821.163 In the South, education
remained principally private even at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.164 And though the issue of prayer at high-school graduations is a
common trigger for Establishment Clause lawsuits,165 according to one source
the first public-high-school graduation ceremony did not take place until
1868.166
Establishment Clause cases also often concern government-sponsored
religious displays, such as crosses,167 the Ten Commandments,168 and holidayseason crèches.169 But the first monument erected by the federal government is
believed to be the Tripoli Monument, which commemorates American naval
officers who died in battle.170 That monument was erected in 1808.171 And it
contains no religious content, beyond an inscription stating that the naval
officers had died in “the year of our Lord, 1804.”172 Further, as Justice Kennedy
remarked in Allegheny, “for reasons quite unrelated to the First Amendment,
displays commemorating religious holidays were not commonplace in 1791.”173
Indeed, beyond the brief date reference in the Tripoli Monument, court opinions
and legal briefs that have attempted to find historical support for government-

160. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 238 & n.7 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213–14 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
161. See, e.g., McCollum, 333 U.S. at 214–15 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment);
Walter H. Small, The New England Grammar School, 1635–1700, 10 SCH. REV. 513, 513–14
(1902).
162. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 238 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
163. See 1 A CYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION 418 (Paul Monroe ed., 1915).
164. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 80 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
165. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992); Adler v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 250
F.3d 1330, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ.,
84 F.3d 1471, 1474–75 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
166. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 705–06 (2010) (plurality opinion).
168. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion).
169. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984).
170. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 n.9 (plurality opinion).
171. See Tripoli Monument, (sculpture), ART INVENTORIES CATALOG, SMITHSONIAN AM.
ART MUSEUM, https://s.si.edu/2Tr5x2F (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
172. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 n.9 (plurality opinion).
173. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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sponsored religious displays have not identified any religious content in any
displays that were erected by the federal government between 1789 and 1808.174
Another hotly contested issue today is the extent to which the Establishment
Clause permits religious exemptions from employment-discrimination and
public-accommodations laws. 175 Of course, in the eighteenth century, there
were no federal laws barring discrimination by employers or businesses.176 The
relevant historical period simply offered no opportunity to speak to this
quintessentially modern controversy.
Beyond legislative prayer and the areas discussed above, one other type of
Establishment Clause controversy is common today: the extent to which
government can permissibly fund religious educational institutions and socialservice providers. 177 But this issue generally did not come up in the late
eighteenth century either, because the federal government was not funding any
general education or social-service programs then.178 As Douglas Laycock has
put it, “[t]here were no programs in which government broadly funded some
private activity that both churches and secular organizations engaged in.”179
There is, however, one series of federal actions that proponents of public
funding of religious education raise in support of arguments that the
Establishment Clause was intended to permit public funding of religious
instruction under some circumstances: federal support for missionary efforts
among Native Americans.180 But this practice did not begin until the mid-1790s,
and it took some time for it to evolve toward federal funding of church-operated
schools for Native Americans: In 1795, President Washington signed a treaty
with three tribes, promising payment to build a church.181 In 1796, the Fourth
Congress passed a law ceding land to a religious organization for missionary
activities. 182 In 1803, President Jefferson entered into a treaty with the
Kaskaskia Tribe promising that the government would pay for a church and a
174. See infra text accompanying notes 191–231.
175. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1987); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661, 685 &
n.24 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. docketed, No. 19-123
(July 25, 2019); Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. 11-cv-05836 RBL, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 175515, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2012).
176. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
184–85 (2012); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10 (1883).
177. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1997); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988).
178. See Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government Dollars—And Schools?, 131
HARV. L. REV. 133, 142–44 (2017).
179. Id. at 143–44.
180. See id. at 144 n.90 (citing with disapproval ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 57–80, 261–70 (1988)).
181. Cord, supra note 180, at 58.
182. Id. at 42–43.
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Catholic priest “who will engage to perform for the said tribe the duties of his
office and also to instruct as many of their children as possible in the rudiments
of literature.”183 By the 1820s, missionaries and other religious groups on tribal
lands were operating schools with government funding, and this practice
continued until the late nineteenth century.184
Public funding for missionary efforts among Native Americans is, like the
plainly unconstitutional 1798 Sedition Act,185 better viewed as an example of
governmental action contrary to the intent of the First Amendment than as
evidence of the Amendment’s intent. It commenced closer in time to the
enactment of the Sedition Act than to the approval of the First Amendment.
What is more, James Madison, “the leading architect of the religion clauses of
the First Amendment,” 186 understood the Establishment Clause to strictly
prohibit public funding for the support of religion. In 1811, as president,
Madison vetoed a bill that would have granted a parcel of federal land to a
church, “[b]ecause the bill . . . comprises a principle and precedent for the
appropriation of funds of the United States for the use and support of religious
societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares that
‘Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment.’” 187
Madison’s views against public funding of religious training were set forth at
length in his famous 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, 188 which was written in opposition to a bill Patrick Henry had
proposed in the Virginia Legislature that would have provided tax funding for
“learned teachers” of “Christian knowledge,” among other aspects of religious
ministries. 189 The Supreme Court has long recognized the Memorial and
Remonstrance as a cornerstone document explaining the Establishment Clause’s
intent.190

183. Id. at 38; see also Laycock, supra note 111, at 915; J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’
Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 755, 766–67 (2001).
184. See Cord, supra note 180, at 63, 80; Laycock, supra note 178, at 144.
185. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273–74 (1964) (citing Sedition Act of
1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596).
186. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184 (2012)
(quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 141 (2011)).
187. JAMES MADISON, VETO MESSAGES (Feb. 28, 1811), reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, 1808–1819 132 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
188. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785)
¶¶ 12–13, 15, reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, app. at 63–72 (1947).
189. See PATRICK HENRY, A BILL ESTABLISHING A PROVISION FOR TEACHERS OF THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION (1784); Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven
Questions from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783–84, 783
n.3 (2002).
190. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 563 U.S. at 140–41; Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973); Everson, 330 U.S. at 11–13.
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2. Irrelevance of Most Historical Events Relied on by Proponents of a
Historical-Practice Test
Like the funding of missionary work directed at Native Americans, the vast
majority of the historical actions on which proponents of a historical-practice
test rely are not legitimate indicators of the Establishment Clause’s intent. The
actions either were not taken by the federal government or did not occur close
enough in time to Congress’s 1789 approval of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, most
of the cited actions took place long after 1789, some occurred before 1789, some
were taken by state or local governments, and some were taken by private
citizens on land that was not even part of the United States at the time.
For example, in his opinion in Allegheny, the historical events Justice
Kennedy cited included the Supreme Court’s practice of opening its sessions
with “God save the United States and this honorable Court,”191 a practice that is
not known to date back earlier than 1827;192 Congress’s creation of a prayer
room in the Capitol,193 in 1954;194 a statute that directs the president to annually
declare a National Day of Prayer,195 which was enacted in 1952;196 the words
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance,197 which were added in 1954;198 and
the use of “In God we trust”199 as our national motto, which dates back only to
1956,200 and on U.S. currency, which dates back to 1864.201
Similarly, the historical examples cited by the plurality opinion in Van Orden
v. Perry—which addressed the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments
display 202 —included various depictions of the Ten Commandments in the

191. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 672 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
192. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Original Meaning of “God”: Using the Language of the
Framing Generation to Create a Coherent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 98 MARQ. L. REV.
1035, 1042–43 (2015).
193. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
194. Congressional Prayer Room, THE OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://chaplain.house.gov/religion/prayer_room.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2019).
195. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
196. See Joint Resolution of Apr. 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-324, 66 Stat. 64.
197. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
198. Joint Resolution of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249.
199. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 673 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
200. Joint Resolution of July 30, 1956, Pub. L. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732.
201. See New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d 1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 2018).
202. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion).
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Supreme Court building, 203 which was constructed in 1935; 204 a Ten
Commandments display in the Library of Congress that dates back to 1897;205 a
depiction of the Ten Commandments in the National Archives Building, 206
which was constructed in the mid-1930s; 207 a depiction of the Ten
Commandments in a 1936 statue in the Department of Justice building;208 a 1947
statue in front of the Ronald Reagan Building that contains a depiction of the
Ten Commandments;209 a sculpture containing the Ten Commandments and a
cross outside the federal courthouse in Washington, D.C.,210 which opened in
1952;211 a 1950 statue depicting Moses in the Chamber of the U.S. House of
Representatives;212 religious references in inscriptions on or in the Washington
Monument, 213 which was completed in 1884, 214 the Jefferson Memorial, 215
which was dedicated in 1943, 216 and the Lincoln Memorial, 217 which was

203. Id. at 688 (plurality opinion).
204. The Supreme Court Building, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/courtbuilding.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
205. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion).
206. Id. (plurality opinion).
207. See A History of the National Archives Building, Washington, DC, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/about/history/building.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
208. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion); The Robert F. Kennedy Building:
Celebrating Art and Architecture on the 75th Anniversary 50, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/06/30/75RFKBuilding.pdf.
209. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion); American Architectural Foundation
Sponsors Public Art in the Federal Triangle Symposium, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN. (Apr. 23,
1998), https://www.gsa.gov/node/80869; International Religious Freedom Report: 2005
Introduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51385.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
210. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion).
211. See
Courthouse
History,
U.S.
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR
D.C.,
https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/courthouse-history (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
212. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion); Moses, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL,
https://www.aoc.gov/art/relief-portrait-plaques-lawgivers/moses (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
213. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 n.9 (plurality opinion).
214. See Washington Monument: History & Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/wamo/learn/historyculture/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
215. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 n.9 (plurality opinion).
216. See Thomas Jefferson Memorial Construction, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/thje/learn/historyculture/memorialconstruction.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2019).
217. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 n.9 (plurality opinion).
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dedicated in 1922;218 and the reference discussed above to “the year of our Lord,
1804,” in the 1808 Tripoli Monument.219
The recent concurring opinion in Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola—which
advocated for a historical-practice test while addressing the constitutionality of
a cross display220—relied on a cross erected by a Jesuit priest in upstate New
York in 1688 “when the territory was under French control”;221 a cross erected
by a Spanish missionary in 1782 in California,222 which did not become part of
the United States until 1848;223 a cross erected by settlers of a Texas town in
1847,224 the year before the United States acquired Texas;225 a cross erected in
1858 on top of a chapel in a U.S. military fort in Virginia;226 a cross erected in
1888 in Gettysburg National Military Park in Pennsylvania;227 a cross erected in
1890 in the Naval Academy cemetery in Maryland;228 a cross erected in the City
of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1898;229 a cross donated to the City of Monterey,
California, in 1905; 230 and a cross erected in New Canaan, Connecticut, in
1923.231
The defendants in Kondrat’yev relied on these and similar examples in their
brief.232 They also cited religious references in state constitutions during our
Founding Era, as well as religious symbolism in the national seal—which was
adopted in 1782, seven years before Congress’s submission of the First
Amendment.233 Likewise, the majority of the divided panel in New Doe Child
#1 v. United States—which used a historical-practice analysis in upholding the
placement of “In God We Trust” on currency—relied on the statement in the
218. See
Construction
of
the
Lincoln
Memorial,
NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/linc/learn/historyculture/lincoln-memorial-construction.htm (last visited Jan.
29, 2019).
219. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 n.9 (plurality opinion); Tripoli Monument, (sculpture),
supra note 171; supra text accompanying notes 170–72.
220. Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 903 F.3d 1169, 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2018) (Newsom,
J., concurring in the judgment), vacated and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2772 (2019).
221. Id. at 1180 (Newsom, J., concurring in the judgment).
222. Id.
223. See The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-ofGuadalupe-Hidalgo.
224. Kondrat’yev, 903 F.3d at 1181 (Newsom, J., concurring in the judgment).
225. See The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, supra note 223.
226. Kondrat’yev, 903 F.3d at 1181 (Newsom, J., concurring in the judgment).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Appellants’ Opening Brief at 54–57 and Addendum 2, Kondrat’yev, 903 F.3d 1169
(No. 17-13025), 2017 WL 4325013.
233. See id. at *53.
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Declaration of Independence, which was issued thirteen years before Congress’s
approval of the First Amendment, “that all men are . . . endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights.” 234 Additionally, both the New Doe Child
majority opinion and the plurality opinion in American Legion relied on the
statement in the Northwest Territory Ordinance, which was adopted in 1787,
two years before approval of the First Amendment, that “[r]eligion, morality,
and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”235
Both opinions asserted that the First Congress reenacted the Northwest Territory
Ordinance, 236 but Douglas Laycock has explained that this “claim is false,”
because the First Congress actually enacted only “two technical amendments”
to the Ordinance, which did not include the religious references.237
3. Impotence of the Few Historical Events that Could Properly be
Considered Under a Historical-Practice Test
Proponents of a historical-practice test have, to our knowledge, identified only
two actions—and arguably a third—that are legitimate candidates for serving as
evidence of the intent of the First Amendment’s framers because they were taken
by the federal government sufficiently close in time to the Amendment’s
enactment. The first is Congress’s approval of funding of congressional
chaplains three days before approval of the language of the Bill of Rights.238
The second is Congress’s passage the day after the First Amendment was
proposed of a resolution that asked the president to proclaim “a day of public
thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed, by acknowledging, with grateful hearts,
the many signal favours of Almighty God.”239 The third—and this one is more
tenuous because it was approved on March 3, 1791, nearly a year and a half after
Congress’s approval of the First Amendment (but still before the Amendment
was ratified by the States in December 1791)—is Congress’s authorization of
the appointment of a chaplain for the U.S. Army.240
Before discussing whether these examples are useful to the adjudication of
Establishment Clause controversies that relate to different issues, we emphasize
234. See New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d 1015, 1021–22 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
235. See id. at 1022 (quoting NORTHWEST TERRITORY ORDINANCE OF 1787, Article III)
(internal citation omitted); accord Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087
(2019) (plurality opinion).
236. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087 (plurality opinion); New Doe Child, 901 F.3d at 1022.
237. See Laycock, supra note 111, at 915 & n.209.
238. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–88 (1983).
239. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1826 ed.); SEN. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 88
(1820 ed.)).
240. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Act of March 3, 1791, Ch. 28,
§ 5, 1 Stat. 222).
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that it is highly questionable whether these actions in fact were consistent with
the Establishment Clause’s intent. The Supreme Court has regularly looked to
the views on religious liberty of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson—the
First Amendment’s leading architects—in ascertaining the Amendment’s
intent.241 But after he completed his service as president, Madison wrote that
the congressional chaplaincies violated the Establishment Clause, explaining,
“[t]he law appointing Chaplains establishes a religious worship for the national
representatives, to be performed by Ministers of religion, elected by a majority
of them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes.”242 Madison similarly
concluded that the military chaplaincies were unconstitutional, even though he
thought that “[t]he object of this establishment is seducing; the motive to it is
laudable.”243 And, as president, Jefferson refused to issue Thanksgiving prayer
proclamations because he thought that they were unconstitutional: “I consider
the government of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution from
intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or
exercises.”244 Despite issuing Thanksgiving proclamations during wartime as
president, Madison also subsequently agreed that they were contrary to the
Establishment Clause.245 What is more, unlike opening prayers in Congress,
which have continued since their inception,246 presidential prayer proclamations
were issued only six times before 1862: in 1789 and 1795 by George
Washington, in 1798 and 1799 by John Adams (these two were not on
Thanksgiving), and in 1814 and 1815 by Madison.247
Even if these three practices are, for the sake of argument, treated as consistent
with the intent of the First Amendment, they shed little light on how to decide
church-state controversies about other matters. Legislative prayer is a
ceremonial practice that is principally directed at legislators themselves, not the
public. 248 The Thanksgiving proclamations issued by early presidents were
241. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963); id. at 234
(Brennan, J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437 (1961); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
242. Elizabeth Fleet, Madison’s “Detached Memoranda”, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558 (1946).
243. Id. at 559.
244. See Leo Pfeffer, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 266 (rev. ed. 1967) (quoting 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428–30 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1903)).
245. See Laycock, supra note 111, at 914.
246. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
247. See Thanksgiving Day Proclamations 1789–Present, WHAT SO PROUDLY WE HAIL,
https://www.whatsoproudlywehail.org/curriculum/the-american-calendar/thanksgiving-dayproclamations-1789-present (last visited Jan. 29, 2019); Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations
1789–1815: George Washington, John Adams, James Madison, PILGRIM HALL MUSEUM,
http://www.pilgrimhallmuseum.org/pdf/TG_Presidential_Thanksgiving_Proclamations_1789_
1815.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
248. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 584 (2014); id. at 587–88 (plurality
opinion).
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nonsectarian, ecumenical, isolated written statements that were not presented in
coercive environments. 249 And military chaplains have been upheld as
constitutional on the ground that they are necessary to protect the right to free
exercise of religion of soldiers whom the government stations at places where
religious services would otherwise be unavailable;250 to the extent that military
chaplains are provided to military office personnel stationed in urban areas or to
retired military personnel, their constitutionality is in doubt, because the
chaplains are not needed to enable these personnel to exercise their religions.251
None of these three practices is helpful to determining how the Establishment
Clause should be applied in the coercive environment of public schools, to
permanent and prominent sectarian displays on public property, to requests on
religious grounds for exemptions from anti-discrimination laws, or to the
provision of substantial sums of public funds to private religious institutions.
Thus, with respect to the Establishment Clause cases that typically confront
courts today (other than legislative-prayer cases), there is simply not enough
relevant history for a historical-practice analysis to be workable.
And even if there were more relevant examples of early federal-government
conduct that might legitimately be treated as consistent with the Establishment
Clause’s intent, a historical-practice test would still give little guidance in cases
that do not address specific practices that go back to our country’s Founding Era.
As formulated by Justice Kennedy in Allegheny, a historical-practice test
apparently would ask whether a challenged practice has a “greater potential for
an establishment of religion” than “legitimate practices two centuries old.”252
How is a court to assess whether one practice has a “greater potential for an
establishment of religion” than another? Such a “standard” would provide much
less guidance to courts—and would be much more susceptible to capricious “we
know it when we see it” application—than the purpose, effect, and entanglement
prohibitions of the oft-criticized253 Lemon test.
IV. PROPER USE OF HISTORY IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Though governmental actions that followed the adoption of the First
Amendment are generally not the right events to consider, we do not contend
that there should be no role for history in Establishment Clause analysis. The
249. See Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations, supra note 247; Ron Soodalter, In These
Divisive Times, This Story of American Thanksgiving Bears Lessons Worth Heeding,
AIRFORCETIMES (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.airforcetimes.com/off-duty/2018/11/22/in-thesedivisive-times-this-story-of-american-thanksgiving-bears-lessons-worth-heeding/.
250. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 1985).
251. Id. at 237–38.
252. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
253. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–400
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring), and citations therein.
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historical guides courts should look at instead are the events that triggered the
Establishment Clause’s creation, and the writings of the leading thinkers behind
the Clause—Madison and Jefferson.254 And such historical analysis does not
require wholesale changes in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Far from it.
For the Supreme Court has already used such analysis to derive existing
Establishment Clause rules.
Indeed, the Court did so in its 1947 decision Everson v. Board of Education,255
the first case that applied the Establishment Clause to the states, 256 which
considered the constitutionality of a township’s practice of paying for bus
transportation to private, religious schools. The Court “review[ed] the
background and environment of the period in which [the Establishment Clause]
was fashioned and adopted,” describing the “conditions and practices which [the
early Americans] fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for
themselves and for their posterity,” and the “evils, fears, and political problems
that caused [the Establishment Clause] to be written into our Bill of Rights.”257
The Court detailed the religious strife that led American colonists to leave
Europe, how that strife persisted in the colonies, and how it ultimately fostered
among the colonists the belief that “individual religious liberty could be
achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs
of any religious individual or group.”258
The Court focused particularly on the writings of James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson in opposition to continued taxation for the support of religion in
Virginia, exemplified by Patrick Henry’s 1784 proposal of a bill for that
purpose. 259 Madison wrote in response his landmark Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, which
eloquently argued that a true religion did not need the support of law;
that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to
support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a
society required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that

254. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963); id. at 234
(Brennan, J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437–38 (1961); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
255. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8–16.
256. See, e.g., Douglas E. Stewart, Jr., Going Back in Time: How the Kansas Board of
Education’s Removal of Evolution from the State Curriculum Violates the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause, 20 REV. LITIG. 549, 565 (2001).
257. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
258. Id. at 8–11.
259. See id. at 11–12; PATRICK HENRY, A BILL ESTABLISHING A PROVISION FOR TEACHERS
OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (1784).
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cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of governmentestablished religions.260
And Jefferson wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, which likewise
powerfully advocated against governmental support for, coercion of,
discrimination based on, and other involvement with religion. 261 The Court
explained that “the provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and
adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the
same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.”262
Then, drawing on this history, the Court listed a set of fundamental
Establishment Clause rules:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.263
“In the words of Jefferson,” concluded the Court, “the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation
between Church and State.’”264
Fifteen years later, in Engel v. Vitale, the Court again rested its analysis in a
foundational Establishment Clause case on an examination of the historical
abuses that the Clause’s framers meant to prevent.265 In that decision, the Court
struck down a public school district’s policy of requiring the recitation of a
prayer, composed by state officials, at the beginning of each school day.266 Most
of the Court’s opinion was devoted to discussion of European and colonial
practices that the Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit.267 The Court
260. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12 (citing 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1901)).
261. See id. at 12–13; Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (1786),
https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/virginia-statute-religious-freedom.
262. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
263. Id. at 15–16.
264. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
265. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425–36 (1962).
266. Id. at 422–24, 436.
267. See id. at 425–36.
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recounted how the government of England established a church and prescribed
particular prayers and religious exercises, how early colonists came to America
to escape such practices, how some colonies established similar practices
themselves, the persecution and division that resulted, how Madison and
Jefferson led opposition in Virginia against governmental support of or
involvement with religion in response, and how the Establishment Clause was
intended to prevent these kinds of practices.268 Looking to this history, the Court
concluded that the “first and most immediate purpose” of the Establishment
Clause “rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion.”269 And, added the Court, “[w]hen
the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”270
The following year, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the
Court struck down enactments requiring that public-school days begin with
Bible readings or prayer recitations.271 The Court again discussed the history of
religious strife in Europe and the colonies, more briefly than in Everson and
Engel, but pointing to those decisions as providing additional detail. 272 The
Court summed up that history thus: “Nothing but the most telling of personal
experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears . . . could have
planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our
heritage.” 273 As a result, noted the Court, “the views of Madison and
Jefferson”—leading supporters of that liberty—”came to be incorporated . . . in
the Federal Constitution.”274 The Establishment Clause mandates governmental
neutrality toward religion, the Court added, based on
a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups
might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or
a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official
support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind
the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.275
Drawing on this history, the Court described two familiar Establishment
Clause principles:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and primary
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
268. Id. at 425–33.
269. Id. at 431.
270. Id.
271. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224–27 (1963).
272. Id. at 212–14 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ, 330 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1947); Engel, 370 U.S. at
428 n.10, 434).
273. Id. at 214.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 222.
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religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.276
These purpose and effect rules, together with the prohibition against religious
entanglement discussed in Engel, serve as the core of the well-known Lemon
test.277
In numerous subsequent cases, the Supreme Court relied on pre-Revolution
history and the writings of Madison and Jefferson to interpret the Establishment
Clause. In Flast v. Cohen, for example, citing Madison and noting that “[o]ur
history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who
drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing
and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to
support religion in general,” the Court explained that “[t]he Establishment
Clause was designed as a specific bulwark against such potential abuses of
governmental power.” 278 In Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, the Court relied on Madison’s rebuke of Patrick Henry’s
proposal to fund religious ministries in Virginia to support a conclusion that
public funding of religious education is prohibited even when it partially aids
secular goals. 279 In Larson v. Valente, the Court looked to European and
colonial historical abuses and the writings of Madison to derive the principle that
“[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”280 In his majority
opinion in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy cited Madison’s writings in
explaining that the Establishment Clause, among other purposes, “exist[s] to
protect religion from government interference.”281
More recently, in its 2005 decision McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,
the Supreme Court cited the history of religious conflict in England and the
colonies as support for reaffirming the principle that “the government may not
favor one religion over another, or religion over irreligion.” 282 In his 2011
majority opinion in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,
Justice Kennedy looked to Madison’s writings to describe the injury taxpayers
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278. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1968) (citing 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)).
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(1973).
280. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1982).
281. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589–90 (1992).
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suffer when their money is taken to aid religious institutions.283 And in his 2012
opinion for a unanimous court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& School v. EEOC, Chief Justice Roberts examined English and colonial history
and the writings of Madison to support a holding that government must not
become involved in the selection of ministers.284
V. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing cases illustrate, by considering the historical abuses that the
Establishment Clause was meant to prevent, and the writings of the leading
thinkers behind the Clause, the Supreme Court has formulated a host of clear
and specific rules for interpreting it. These rules protect values and principles at
the heart of the Clause, which—in today’s pluralistic society—are even more
important than they were in 1789: the government must not discriminate against
anyone based on their religion or lack of faith; the government must not pressure
or influence anyone to take part in religious activities; the government must not
fund religious education or ministry; the government must not interfere with or
become involved in the affairs of religious institutions; the government must not
permit its power to be wielded in the service of theological goals.285
Replacing existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence with a test that
measures challenged practices against post-1789 historical practices not only
would provide courts with wholly insufficient guidance but also would put these
core Establishment Clause values at great risk. The few Founding Era historical
practices that might—at least arguably—be legitimately viewed as consistent
with the intent of the Clause’s framers provide little guidance in most
Establishment Clause areas, and thus little protection for the rights that the
Clause was intended to guard. And other historical actions that proponents of a
historical-practice test rely on—non-federal actions and actions insufficiently
close to 1789—can easily reflect conduct by politicians who ignored the Clause
or were never bound by it, instead of validly evincing the Clause’s intent.
Relying on such actions could eviscerate Establishing Clause values instead of
vindicating them. And that use of history would betray—and risk repeating—
the very history that resulted in the Establishment Clause’s creation.
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